In secret image sharing, a polynomial interpolation technique heavy experiences a computation load when the secret image is retrieved later. To the contrary, fast approaches often need larger storage space due to pixel expansion property. This paper proposes a missing-allowable (k, n) scheme which is fast and with a reasonable pixel expansion rate (per). The scheme generates n extremely-noisy shadow images for the given secret color image A, and any k out of these n shadows can recover A loss-freely. In average, to decode a color pixel of A, the retrieval uses only three exclusion-OR operations among 24-bit numbers. Hence, the new method has very fast decoding speed, and its pixel expansion rate is always acceptable (0 < per < 2).
Introduction
Secret sharing using polynomials 1, [9] [10] [11] 13 is one of the popular approach to protect secret images. This kind of approach can restore the secret images without any loss, and the size of each shadow image can even be several times smaller than that of the given secret image.
9,11 Therefore, space-wasting is seldom a problem for sharing using polynomials. However, the retrieval computation is very slow because of the evaluation of polynomials.
On the other hand, a faster approach is to use the digitalized versions of Refs. 3, 4, 15 and 16 to share a digital image among several "size-enlarged" digital images called shadows. Recently, to improve the efficiency and speed in sharing digital color images, Lukac and Plataniotis smartly proposed some easily implemented methods [5] [6] [7] [8] whose decoding use "OR-like" operations or look up basis matrices.
Their new methods can recover the original image error-freely at a very fast speed; although in Refs. 5-7 quite often the shadow images generated in their (k, n)-schemes are still several times larger than the secret image. (Notably, (k, n)-schemes mean that in the reconstruction of the secret, any k out of n shadows can obtain the secret; while less than k shadows cannot.) As for Ref. 8 , the size of each shadow image is the same as the secret image size, but Ref. 8 considers k = n = 2 only. Although people can use the digitalized version of an elegant method proposed in Ref. 14 that has no size expansion because of the probabilistic skill; the recovered secret image is not lossless. In general, size expansion problem is a disadvantage for fast approaches: to store digital shadow images in the computer often requires large storage space.
From the analysis in the above two paragraphs, we can see that these two types of sharing approaches are quite different, and each has its own speed-versus-space advantage and disadvantage. A question arises naturally: "Can a sharing system have both advantages in speed and space?" In other words, can people have some economic-size shadows which can reconstruct the given secret image in a loss-free manner after only using a few operations to decode each pixel? The answer is positive. Wang et al. 12, 17 had gracefully provided their answer, to a certain level, in their second scheme 12 which is an (n, n) scheme. In the current paper, we will improve Wang et al.'s (n, n) scheme in order to have the "missing-allowable" (k, n)-threshold ability, i.e. in the reconstruction of the secret, any k out of n shadows will work. The proposed scheme generates the n desired shadows for a given color image A, so that each shadow's size is less than two times the size of A. Furthermore, the lossless decoding process only uses a few exclusive-OR (XOR) operations (symbolized as "⊕"), so there is no complex computation.
The remaining portion of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some polynomial-style and fast schemes for image sharing. Section 3 presents the proposed method. Section 4 gives some analyses about the proposed scheme. Experimental results are included in Sec. 5. Finally, conclusions are provided in Sec. 6.
A Simple Review of Image-Sharing Methods
This section first review two kinds of well-known techniques for sharing secret images: polynomial-style approaches 1,9-11,13 as described in Sec. 2.1, and fast as approaches [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Polynomial-style schemes
All schemes in Refs. 1, 9-11 and 13 apply the polynomial interpolation to divide a secret data A into n distinct data sets D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n called shares or shadows; and the secret data A cannot be revealed until k of n shadows become available. To share an image, the data A becomes the values of pixels. To split A into n shadows, people can pick a prime number p and a polynomial 
Using any k pairs of n produced pairs
, people can get all coefficients a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k−1 in q(x) by the Largrange's interpolation, and hence the secret data A = a 0 is also revealed. To reveal the secret data A, the computation complexity is O(k log 2 k) for polynomial interpolation.
Lukac and Plataniotis's fast schemes
For fast decoding, digitalized versions based on Refs. 3, 4, 15 and 16 can be used. However, to share digital color images more effectively, Lukac and Plataniotis elegantly restructure the original digital color image files using the "OR-like" function or looking up basis matrices in their sharing methods.
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Their new schemes to share and recover digital images are easy to implement, and the retrieval speeds are very fast; although in Refs. 5-7, the shadow images generated in their (k, n)-schemes are still several times larger than the secret image. The problem might get worse as the values of k and n become very large. (As for Ref. 8 , as stated earlier, the size of each shadow image is the same as the secret image size, but Ref. 8 considers k = n = 2 only.) As a result, to store the created digital shadows often need larger storage space in a computer.
Wang et al.'s fast (n, n) scheme
Wang et al. also proposed in Refs. 12 and 17 some fast schemes with the intention of small pixel expansion rate (per). Their (k, n) scheme in Ref. 17 and their first scheme (a (2, n) scheme) in Ref. 12 are both probabilistic (and hence might cause loss in image retrieval). Their second scheme in Ref. 12 is a deterministic (n, n) scheme for grayscale images (extension to color images is also possible); and hence causes lossless retrieval. Notably, in their (n, n) scheme, 12 it splits a secret image A among n shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , whose pixel expansion rate is one. After receiving all n shadows, it uses only n − 1 XOR operations to reconstruct a pixel of A. Their (n, n)-scheme algorithm is as follows:
Coding:
Step 1. Input a secret image A.
Step 2. Generate n-1 random images B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n−1 , each has a size A.
Step 3. Compute the shadows as follows:
Step 4. Output the n shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n .
Decoding:
Reveal A using the formula
In this paper, in order to extend Wang et al.'s (n, n) no-threshold scheme to (k, n) threshold scheme; we introduce a (k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix H, and a {B 1 , B 2 } partition-and-recombination process. The scheme still holds the two advantages of Ref. 12: fast computation speed and small pixel expansion rate. In fact, we only need three XOR operations in average to reconstruct a pixel; and the ratio of each shadow's size over the secret image's size is between 0 and 2, i.e. 0 < per < 2 (and per = 2/n in k = n case). The statement is true in all (k, n) cases.
The Proposed Method
To generate the desired shadows, the encoding algorithm in Sec. 3.1 will need the two new techniques described in Secs. 3.2 and 3.3. To help readers understand the encoding, a numerical example is also given in Sec. 3.4.
Then, Sec. 3.5 introduces the decoding algorithm that retrieves the secret. For easier understanding of the decoding algorithm; a numerical example for decoding is also given in Sec. 3.6.
The encoding algorithm
First, we illustrate here our encoding algorithm which creates n final shadows that meet the (k, n) threshold goal. This encoding algorithm will use two other new tools: the (k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix in Sec. 3.2, and the {B1, B2} partition-and-recombination process in Sec. 3.3.
The encoding algorithm:
Step 1. Input a color secret image A.
Step 2. Generate a random image B 1 so that B 1 and A have the same size.
Step 3. Generate another image B 2 using B 2 = B 1 ⊕ A, where ⊕ denotes bit-by-bit XOR.
Step 4. Let m = C n k−1 . Generate the (k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix H described in Sec. 3.2. Notably, the matrix H is public.
Step (The first w rows were C 2 , next w rows were C 3 , final w rows were C 6 .) So the number of rows of the final shadow was three times larger than that of each temporary shadow, but the columns (h) were the same. Now, after the first w rows, since we have already completed C 2 , and C 3 is to be attached behind C 2 , we insert a separator-row of (h/2) + (h/2) = h elements, i.e. 222222222222222222222333333333333333333333, so that people can understand C 2 is above this separator-row and C 3 is below this separator-row. Then we store the C 3 using next w rows. Then, insert another separator-row of h/2 + h/2 = h elements, i.e. 3333333333333333333336666666666666666666666, before attaching C 6 . In summary, if separators are used, the final-shadow has (3w + 2) rows rather than 3w rows, and the (3w + 2) rows owned by this {C 2 , C 3 , C 6 } person will be [C 2 ] (which has w rows, each row has h pixels ) 222222222222222222222333333333333333333333 [C 3 ] (which has w rows, each row has h pixels ) 3333333333333333333336666666666666666666666 [C 6 ] (which has w rows, each row has h pixels ) Notably, in Step 4 of the encoding algorithm, we have already stated that the shadows-assignment matrix H is public, so the decoder can always read from H to know the number of temporary shadows owned per participant. For example, in H in Eq. (3), each participant gets 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 temporary shadows. So, in Option 1, the decoder will know that the number of rows in this final shadow is 3w + (3 − 1) = (3w + 2). Therefore, the decoder can always figure out how many rows are in the final shadow, and hence, know how many pixels are in each row.
Option 2.
(An option using the convention of ascending-order indices). In fact, from the viewpoint stated in the final paragraph of Option 1 above, the separator rows can also be omitted, as explained below. Assume each participant owns certain shadows. Let the shadow indices be all arranged in the ascending order. For example, if the matrix H is as shown in Eq. (3), then the person P 1 owns (copies of the) temporary shadows C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , the person P 2 owns temporary shadows C 2 , C 3 , C 6 , the person P 3 owns C 1 , C 3 , C 5 , and the person P 4 owns C 1 , C 2 , C 4 . Notice the indices are all in ascending order (i.e. 4 < 5 < 6; 2 < 3 < 6; 1 < 3 < 5; 1 < 2 < 4). So, even if we do not use separators, the decoder can still read the "public" matrix H to know that each participant owns three temporary shadows; and hence, divide each person's final shadow into three parts of equal size; and then use matrix H to identify easily which temporary shadow is the first one-third of that person's final shadow, which temporary shadow is the middle one-third, and which temporary shadow is the final one-third. shadows (these are not our final shadows, just consider them as our temporary shadows). Then, we duplicate each temporary shadow several times. Then, for n people participating in the sharing game, let each person get one or no copy from each of m temporary shadows. Each person can have copies from more than one temporary shadow. However, no person can get copies from all m shadows; otherwise, that person alone can unveil the secret.
After this distribution assignment of the copies of m produced temporary shadows, we wish that when any k or more people gather together in an image-recovery meeting, the chairman of the meeting can collect all m temporary shadows from the attendants of this meeting; and hence, can restore the secret image according to Wang et al.' s (m, m) image-recovery scheme. We also require that a meeting of less than k people together is insufficient to collect all m temporary shadows; and hence, cannot reveal the secret image. We will call the two requirements stated above in this paragraph as the "(k, n, m) shadows-assignment requirements".
From the idea above, we may create a matrix H of n rows and m columns. Its n rows represent n persons; and its m columns represent the m (distinct) temporaryshadows produced by Wang et al.'s deterministic (m, m) scheme. The element of H is either 0 or 1. The ith person (row) has a copy of jth shadow image (column) if and only if H ij = 1. In order to make the matrix meet the expected (k, n, m) shadows-assignment requirements described above, we let each column of H have exactly k − 1 zeros and n − k + 1 ones. More specifically, let H have m = C n k−1 columns, and each column of H be a permutation of the n-dimensional basic column vector (000. . . 0011111. . . 111) which has k − 1 leading zeros followed by n − k + 1 ones.
This obviously guarantees that: (i) each temporary shadow C j will appear at least once when k out of n persons attend the image-recovery meeting; (ii) at least one temporary shadow C j will disappear when k − 1 or fewer persons attend the recovery meeting. The proof is as follows:
where P i and H ij ∈ {0, 1} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, . . . , m). In this equation, P i represents the attendance status of ith person (0 is absence and 1 is attendance); and H is the created (k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix. Therefore,
counts the number of times (copies) that the temporary shadow C j appears in the image-recovery meeting. Two observations are:
(i) When k persons attend the recovery meeting, then k of n elements in (P 1 , . . . , P n ) are one, and the remaining n − k elements are zero. Therefore, each X j must be at least one, for there is exactly k − 1 zeros in every column j of H. This implies that each temporary shadow C j will appear at least once in the recovery meeting. (ii) When only k−1 or fewer persons attend the recovery meeting, then at most k−1 of the n elements in (P 1 , . . . , P n ) are one; or equivalently, at least n − k + 1 of n elements in (P 1 , . . . , P n ) are zero. Let Col j = (H 1j , H 2j , . . . , H nj ) be a column of H whose n − k + 1 ones happen to appear at the positions where the vector (P 1 , . . . , P n ) obtained these (at least) n − k + 1 zeros. (If (P 1 , . . . , P n ) has more than n − k + 1 zeros, then just randomly choose n − k + 1 positions from the zero entries of (P 1 , . . . , P n ).) The inner product of the vector (P 1 , . . . , P n ) and this special Col j will be zero. In other words, X j = 0. So the temporary shadow C j disappears in the recovery meeting.
In the above construction of the matrix H, recall that we let all m = C
permutations of the n-dim vector (000. . . 001111. . . 11), which has exactly k − 1 leading zeros and n − k + 1 ones, be used as the m columns; and thus obtain the expected n-by-m matrix H. Hereinafter, the matrix H will be called the "(k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix". Below is an example showing the (k, n, m) shadows-assignment matrix H. Assume (k, n) = (3, 4), so m = 6 = C 4 3−1 . Note that each column is just a permutation of the first column, and the first column is an n = 4-dimensional vector which has exactly k − 1 = 3 − 1 = 2 zeros.
As a result, H has four rows (since n = 4) and six columns (since m = 6 = C 4 3−1 ). In this example, the person P 1 owns (copies of the) temporary shadows C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , the person P 2 owns temporary shadows C 2 , C 3 , C 6 , the person P 3 owns temporary shadows C 1 , C 3 , C 5 , and the person P 4 owns temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , C 4 . In this shadows-assignment process, any k = 3 people gathered together can guarantee the appearance of all six temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 and C 6 ; but less than three persons cannot. In other words, three or more people can recover the secret image according to Wang et al.'s deterministic (6, 6) scheme using these six temporary shadows. Less than three people cannot recover because some C j disappears. (1 i m) is the block C i1 contained in B 1 .
Step 2. Create the security mask C * , which is also a block, by the XOR equation
Step 3 In the inverse process to obtain B 1 and B 2 from C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m , the algorithm is as follows (see Fig. 2 where we still use (k = 3, n = 4) as an example):
Step 1. Extract m nonoverlapping blocks C 11 , C 21 , . . . , C m1 which are the upper half of C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m , respectively. Step 2. Recover the security mask C * by the equation
Step 3. Recover the random image B 1 by physically attaching C 11 , C 21 , . . . , C m1 to each other. 
Numerical example of encoding example
In the following encoding example, we do it step by step. Without the loss of generality, assume (k = 3, n = 4), so m = C n k−1 = 6. Also, for easier description, we just use gray-values rather than color-values in the example.
Step 1. Assume the given secret image is a 2 × 3 image A = 
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Step 3. Generate another image B 2 by applying bit-by-bit XOR to B 1 and A, i.e. Step 6. According to the assignment matrix H, assign the copies of the m = 6 temporary shadows {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C 6 } to the n = 4 persons. So, our n = 4 final shadows, hold by n = 4 persons respectively, are 
The decoding algorithm
Given any k final shadows, for example {D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D k }, out of n final shadows produced in Step 6 of Sec. 3.1, the secret image A can be restored as follows:
The decoding algorithm:
Step 1. After referring to (k, n) shadows-assignment matrix H generated in
Step 4 of the encoding algorithm, we know which temporary shadows in Fig. 2 ).
Step 3. Reveal the secret image A using A = B 1 ⊕ B 2 .
Remark.
Step 1 above stated that we are able to know which temporary shadows in {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m } are included in each final shadow D i . As for how to distinguish the temporary shadows in each final shadow D i (so that the related temporary shadows inside each final shadow D i can be distinguished easily to recover the image), see the Remark at the end of Sec. 3.1.
Numerical example for decoding
In the following decoding example, still assume (k = 3, n = 4). So, decoding requires any three of the four final shadows. Without the loss of generality, assume D 1 , D 2 , D 3 are the three available shadows.
Step 1. With the help of matrix H in Step 4 of encoding process, we extract all m = C n k−1 = 6 temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C 6 , which are the same as those created in Step 5 of encoding process of Sec. 3.4.
Step 2. Recover B 1 and B 2 , which are the same as those in Steps 2 and 3 of the encoding process, by implementing the inverse process of {B 1 , B 2 } partition-and-recombination process to all six temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C 6 (see Fig. 2 ).
Step 
Analysis

Recoverability and security
In general, each (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme must satisfy both requirements: the recoverability (any k or more shadows can reveal all information of A) and the security (any k − 1 or fewer shadows cannot reveal secret image A). In our scheme, when any k out of n final shadows are gathered (for example, D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D k ), secret image A is revealed by Steps 1-3 of the decoding algorithm. These steps also explain why our scheme satisfies the recoverability requirement. Firstly, if k or more final shadows are gathered, then we can extract all m temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m from k available final shadows according to (k, n, m) shadows-assignment requirements of matrix H. Secondly, after physically dividing each C i into upper half C i1 and lower half C i3 , we can get C * which is defined Our scheme also satisfies the security requirement. Assume that only k − 1 or fewer final shadows are available. Then, according to (k, n, m) shadowsassignment requirements of matrix H, people cannot obtain all m temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m from these final shadows (see the proof (ii) below Eq. (2) in Sec. 3.2). Assume C q is missing. As a result, people cannot obtain C * defined by C * = C 11 ⊕ C 21 ⊕ · · · ⊕ C m1 , due to the lack of C q1 which is the upper half of C q . Then, without C * , people cannot restore C 12 , C 22 , . . . , C m2 defined by
. So, people cannot generate B 2 . As a result, secret image A = B 1 ⊕ B 2 cannot be revealed due to the absence of B 2 .
Below we discuss the probability of obtaining the right secret image A through guessing. Without the loss of generality, assume that a betrayal party of k − 1 persons has already gathered m − 1 temporary shadows C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m−1 without C m . Notably, A = {A i |1 i m}, i.e. image A can be divided to m blocks, and the recovery of A can be done block by block; in other words, since A = B 1 ⊕ B 2 , we have
Because of the lack of C m = [C m1 |C m3 ] T , the betrayal party will have to guess a value for a pixel in C m1 , then they can use this guessing value to obtain a set of m − 1 pixels' values (one value per block in A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m−1 ). Then they need to guess the value of a pixel at the corresponding position of C m3 (or A m ) so that the pixel value at that position of A m can also be shown. The above is just to recover a pixel (for example, the top-leftmost pixel) of each block A i , 1 i m. This value-guessing of two pixels will be repeated bksize times. Here, bksize is the size of each block A i (1 i m) ; hence bksize is m times smaller than the image size of A.
From the description above, we can evaluate the probability of obtaining the right color image A with size w × h as follows. if the image size is w × h = 512 × 512. Here, s = 1/2 24 is the probability to guess successfully a pixel's value; bksize1 is the number of pixels in C m1 ; and bksize3 is the number of pixels in C m3 . To improve the security further, people can use a prime number as a key (a seed) of a random number generator to rearrange the pixel positions in secret image A (as we did in Ref. 9) before encoding.
Time complexity and storage space needed
In terms of computation complexity, Thien and Lin's polynomial sharing scheme Fang and Lin 2 proposed two other SS (sharing schemes), i.e. an (n, n) XOR-SS and a (k, n) OR-SS, to reduce the size of shadows in Lukac and Plataniotis's.
7 But the (k, n) OR-SS scheme in Ref. 2 still needs many OR operations in decoding, and the complexity is similar as that of Wang et al.'s (k, n) colored probabilistic scheme.
17 In Wang et al.'s (n, n) scheme, 12 only n − 1 XOR operations are required to reconstruct each pixel, which is the same as Fang and Lin's (n, n) XOR-SS scheme.
2 Obviously, the decoding time of most inventions above increases as the value of k or n increases.
For this concern, our new scheme tries to make more stable the speed of Wang et al.'s 12 for any n. In any (k, n) threshold cases, no matter how large the value of n is, we only need at most three bit-by-bit XOR operations to restore a pixel. Notably, each XOR is between a pair of 24-bit values if the image is color.
To observe this, assume that the size of secret image A is w × h, then the number of XOR operations needed to evaluate
XOR operations are required to reveal A from any k final shadows. On average, since image A has w×h pixels, at most three XOR operations are required to restore each pixel. Table 1 below shows a comparison with reported schemes. Obviously, the proposed scheme has the smallest decryption load on average. Notably, the proposed scheme also needs at most three XOR operations in encoding process to share each pixel of secret image into n final shadows D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n , because the decoding process is exactly an inversion of an encoding one. Besides Table 1 , the readers can also refer to Figs. 6 and 7 to see that our decoding time does not increase as n increases its value. Since, besides our method, Wang's 12 is one of the fastest schemes in Table 1 , we only compare our CPU time with Ref. 12 in Fig. 6 . As for Fig. 7 , because Ref. 12 has no (k, n) design if 2 < k < n, no curve for Ref. 12 is drawn there. (We only use this figure to show that our CPU time is really a constant.)
As for the space complexity, Thien and Lin's scheme 9 has a pixel expansion rate per = 1/k for the (k, n) threshold cases. Wang and Su proposed the scheme 11 to reduce 40% of Thien and Lin's shadow images size. On the other hand, as the value of n increases, per is very large for digital versions of schemes. 3, 4, 15, 16 Although the probabilistic scheme 14 has per = 1, the reconstructed secret image is not errorfree. The per in Lukac and Plataniotis's schemes [5] [6] [7] are at least two. Lukac and Plataniotis's special method 8 has no pixel expansion problem (per = 1), but it is only for (2, 2) scheme. Although Fang and Lin's (n, n) and (k, n) schemes still has a per larger than one. In the proposed scheme, our per is between 0 and 2; moreover, close to 0 is possible. To see this, let the size of secret image A be w × h. Since the size of every temporary shadow C i (1 i m) is 2 × (w × h)/m, the size of every final shadow
Here, we have used the fact that each final shadow D i contains C n−1 k−1 temporary shadows. Now, after dividing the above by the size of A, we get our pixel expansion rate, i.e.
Therefore, each final shadow will be at most two times larger than secret image A.
When n is very large and k is two, the rate converges to its upper bound 2. On the other hand,
In the special case when k = n, our per is 2/n, and hence,
Therefore, each shadow will be very small when k = n. (See Fig. 5 , for example, in which n was only 4, so per = 2/n = 2/4 = 0.5. If we had used a very large n, then per would have been much smaller.) In summary, the proposed scheme does not have a serious pixel expansion problem or huge storage-space demanding for shadows (see Table 2 ).
Perfect reconstruction and complications in implementation
In Table 3 , we provide the information about perfect reconstruction. Most schemes mentioned here are lossless in recovery, including our scheme. Exceptions are digitalized versions of Refs. 3, 4, 17, and the (2, n) scheme of Ref. 12 when 2 < n.
Finally, the information about the level of easy-implementation is provided in Table 4 . In summary, 1,9-11,13 evaluated polynomials and the remaining references used OR-like or XOR or look-up tables. 
Experimental Results
In our experiment, the input color image A is the popular test-image shown in Fig. 3(a) . To show our constant decoding-time property, we also record in Figs. 6 and 7 the actual CPU time taken in decoding. The computer used is an IBM laptop with an Intel Pentium 1.70 GHz CPU, and the operating system is Microsoft Window From Fig. 6 , which deals with (n, n) system, it can be seen that our decoding time really does not vary as the value of n varies, but this is not the case for Wang et al's scheme. 12 Notably, for all (k, n) systems, our decoding time still remains constant as n increases its value. An example showing this is given in Fig. 7 in which k = n/2. Note that Wang et al.'s 12 does not have (k, n) systems unless k is n or 2. ; (e) is the recovered error-free A using any three of the four final shadows.
Conclusion
In polynomial-based sharing approach, the shadow size is never a problem, but the decoding speed is very slow due to the polynomial-interpolation evaluation. To the contrary, storage space for shadows is large for almost all fast methods (the pixel expansion rate per is usually at least 2 for (k, n)-threshold schemes, and per = 1 is limited to loss causing schemes or some (n, n) nonthreshold schemes). In this The CPU time (milliseconds) for decoding each (n/2, n) systems by our scheme. There is no curve for Wang et al.'s scheme, 12 for their scheme has no (n/2, n) system or other (k, n) systems when 2 k < n.
paper, we have designed successfully a scheme so that: (1) the generated shadows are of reasonable size (per is between 0 and 2; and close to 0 when the k is large and close to n [see Eqs. (4)- (6)], e.g. per = 2/n in all (n, n) schemes); (2) the scheme only needs three 24-bit XOR operations per pixel to get a recovery of the given color image; and (3) unlike some probabilistic approaches, our recovered images are lossless; (4) our scheme is missing-allowable because it is a (k, n)-threshold scheme which requires only k out of n shadows that appear in the recovery meeting.
We have implemented the cases with (k, n) being, respectively, (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3) , (2, 4) , (3, 4) , (4, 4) , etc. The results are satisfactory in terms of the above advantages. Notably, the method also works for binary or grayscale image because the method is based on bit-by-bit operation. In fact, the given secret image A can be B-bit per pixel for any positive integer B (for example, use B = 1 for binary image, B = 7 or 8 for grayscale image, B = 15 for 5-5-5 pseudo color image, B = 24 for 8-8-8 color image).
